

- White, Graham, and David R. Cameron. 2000. *Cycling into Saigon: The Conservative Transition in Ontario*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1969. 'Rescuing Policy Analysis From PPBS.' *Public Administration Review* (March-April), 189-202.
- Wilson, Jeremy. 1998. *Talk and Log: Wilderness Politics in British Columbia*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

11 Immature Policy Analysis: Building Capacity in Eight Major Canadian Cities

KENNEDY STEWART AND PATRICK J. SMITH

Introduction¹

Policy analysis in Canada's municipalities varies significantly from that undertaken at senior governmental levels, mainly because of the three communities of actors involved: *decision makers*, *knowledge generators*, and *knowledge brokers*. The first operates under a much more debilitating set of institutional arrangements while the other two are either less populated or, at worst, non-existent. As the bulk of this chapter explains, the capacity of local decision makers to direct, receive, and act upon sophisticated policy advice is severely hampered by an antiquated approach to local governing. When coupled with a paucity of knowledge-generating researchers and knowledge-brokering commissions, task forces or city-specific think tanks, the result is that un- or under-supervised civil servants drive and dominate the policy analysis process. While an engaged public service is not inherently problematic, at the senior levels of government this aspect of the policy analysis process is balanced by other institutional forms and broader policy communities than is the norm in Canada's cities.

By comparing electoral and legislative arrangements in eight of Canada's largest cities, this chapter also demonstrates that some metropolitan decision-making communities lag far behind others in terms of capacity. It also suggests that all require significant modernizing before they will be able to play the same role as their senior counterparts and even where the actor communities are adequately populated, local policy analysis is still liable to be truncated and unsophisticated.

Local Governmental Policy Analysis in Canada

This book seeks to explain how three sets, herein deemed 'communities,' of policy actors design, develop, implement and/or evaluate public policies at all levels of Canadian government. As described in the introduction, the book explores how 'decision makers,' 'knowledge generators' and 'knowledge brokers' interact to improve the rationality of the policy-making process by using increasingly sophisticated and integrated policy analysis techniques (Lindquist 1990). Chapters about senior governmental levels explain, for example, the inner workings of national knowledge brokers such as think tanks, or how all three communities interact to generate policy analysis in particular provinces.

Following these ideas, readers might expect a chapter on policy analysis at the local level to follow a similar path, with local mayors and councils seen as the decision makers, academics, and research institutes as knowledge generators, and local commissions, task forces, or organized interest groups as knowledge brokers. However, this analytical framework is mismatched with the local policy analysis process due to the underdeveloped nature, or even complete absence, of knowledge generators and knowledge brokers in most of the country's municipalities. Canada's handful of urban academics could not possibly act as knowledge generators for thousands of municipalities. As municipal commissions and task forces are extremely rare, very few local-specific knowledge brokers exist outside of omnipresent local boards of trade and service clubs. Where local interest groups are often powerful, they are seldom long-lived, well organized, or based on more than emotive responses to local policy problems.

Even in Canada's largest cities, knowledge brokers are far less plentiful than in provincial or national policy-making arenas, and where they do exist their focus is seldom concentrated on solving the problems of a single municipality. For example, Vancouver-based Better Environmentally Sound Transportation (BEST) often lobbies Vancouver City Council to promote 'sustainable transportation and land-use planning, and pedestrian, cycling and transit oriented neighbourhoods,' but as their efforts are aimed at all of Western Canada, what lobbying efforts they do manage are more wide than deep (BEST 2005). Knowledge generation about local problems is usually handled by local planning and policy staff; however, on rare occasions external agencies do generate reports that are adopted at a local level. For example, while the City of Vancouver's homelessness action plan was generated using data gath-

ered by internal planning staff, the Greater Vancouver Regional District's homelessness plan is based on counts taken by consultants who were in turn commissioned by the non-profit Social Planning and Research Council of British Columbia (City of Vancouver 2005; Greater Vancouver Regional District 2003).

As the local governmental knowledge generation and brokerage communities are far smaller than those at senior governmental levels, we feel it might be more instructive to explore the state of decision-making communities in Canada's largest cities. While this may deviate from what has been written elsewhere in this book, capacity in this actor community cannot be taken for granted. For example, federal and provincial politicians set at least a portion of the governmental agenda and steer the work of generators and brokers by campaigning on platforms that they promise to implement if their party forms government. However, as local politics are often bereft of political parties, manifestos are virtually absent from local elections and policy is made on a more ad hoc basis. Or, more disturbingly, where parties do exist, their literature baldly states that elected party officials are not under any 'obligation to policies or platforms' (Non-Partisan Association 2005).

Lack of capacity in local decision-making actor communities may have been less of a problem during much of the twentieth century, when local governments often, and accurately, characterized themselves as administrative wings of senior governments (Federation of Canadian Municipalities 1976). But twenty-first-century municipal governments in Canada, especially those in our largest urban settings, have not only gained more responsibilities through offloading, but have also become increasingly financially independent of former provincial masters. For example, while the City of Vancouver's annual budget has risen to almost \$1 billion, the provincial government contribution has dropped to a mere one per cent of total revenues (City of Vancouver 2003, 17). This decline in the provincial contribution to the local authority has left the City of Vancouver to fend for itself on the revenue side, which has happened at a time of more policy-making freedom (Smith and Stewart 2005).

While it would appear that investigating the capacity of Canadian local government decision-making communities is a necessary first step in understanding local policy analysis, this type of investigation is far from straightforward. There is the difficulty of determining what institutional arrangements might hinder or facilitate such capacity and the fact that examples from which to draw guidance for comparative studies of Canadian local government of any size are rare. Where little

previous investigation has been undertaken, descriptive accounts of institutional behavioural features usually suffice. However, this chapter attempts to move beyond mere description by ranking Canadian cities according to the arrangements surrounding the capacity of their decision makers to effectively fulfill their role in the local policy analysis process. As explained in more detail in the next section, eight categories of data are generated for eight of the largest municipalities in Canada: Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary, and Vancouver. After comparing these cities, the chapter concludes by offering suggestions for further research as to how to improve local governmental policy analysis. Although our ranking may not appeal to all readers, we hope that those who disagree can at least gain some benefit from the new descriptive data. As John Griffith cautions, anyone trying to compare local governing and policy making could find that 'every example can be shown in some way to be unrepresentative and ill-chosen. Any generalization evokes shouts of protest.' Griffith suggests the way out of this dilemma is to recognize that 'some aspects ... are more important and universal than others' (1966, 17). To us, capacity to properly direct and oversee local policy analysis is arguably 'more important,' and this forms the basis of our investigation.

Evaluating Local Governmental Decision Makers' Capacity

From our perspective, the job of decision makers during the process of policy analysis is to set the direction of research and supervise the development and implementation of appropriate policy options. There are two main stages in which to evaluate the capacity of local councils to effectively play their role. During the *electoral stage*, politicians generate a governmental policy agenda through the competitive struggle for votes. During the *legislative stage*, politicians further develop this agenda and oversee the work of civil servants. Although this heuristic description does not include interaction between these two stages, nor how governments respond to mid-term policy demands, the outline does provide broad clues as to where institutional deficiencies undermining capacity might be found.

Electoral Stage Capacity

The question of which type of electoral system *best* builds the capacity of decision makers to set agendas is a source of constant debate in

Canada and elsewhere. However, there has been much agreement about essential institutions and what types of rules and processes to *avoid*. As discussed and contextualized below, three minimum standards stand out in the electoral stage in most recognized democracies: competitive party systems; fair electoral formula; and limits to the amount that candidates can spend during elections.

It is almost impossible to imagine national and provincial elections without political parties. One might even agree with the statement by the (Lortie) Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, that 'without political parties there can't be true democracy' (1991, 207). Parties are primary political organizations that organize an often diverse array of views into more coherent policy packages, which citizens can vote for or against, and which eventually form the governmental agenda. However, in many Canadian cities there are often strong non-partisan traditions and overarching provincial legislation regulating local elections, which actively discourages party formation.

The Canadian tradition of non-partisan local elections is an offshoot of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century municipal reform movement in the United States that sought to separate 'politics,' and the perceived municipal corruption associated with it, from city government by removing local parties from the electoral process (see, for example, Riordan 1963). The American movement followed an even longer trend of divorcing administration from politics, at least traceable to Woodrow Wilson's seminal 1887 essay, *The Study of Administration*, in which he argued that 'the field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics ... Administrative questions are not political questions ... Policy does nothing without the aid of administration but administration is not therefore politics ... The province of administration ... lies outside the proper sphere of politics' (1887/1966, 2, 28-9).

The rationale of the reform movement was to free public administration from the corrupt practices of 'pal-tronage' by creating a politics/administration dichotomy. As Kernaghan and Siegel argue, 'Wilson's distinction between politics and administration was accepted and perpetuated' (1987, 269) to the point that 'the politics-administration dichotomy was assumed both as a self-evident truth and a desirable goal' (Sayre 1958, 103; for some of that 'perpetuation' see also Goodenow 1893, 1905, 1914; White 1926; Willoughby 1927). Kernaghan and Siegel also note: 'During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, administrative reform efforts in both the United States and Canada were

devoted to eradicating patronage from the public service, with a view to promoting efficient administration ... In both the United States and Canada, the two elements of the reform movement – efficiency through the elimination of patronage and efficiency through (rational) scientific management – reinforced one another and became integral components of the merit system' (1991, 341).

In senior governmental terms, such reforms allowed party politics and administration to coexist, even as the dichotomy itself was challenged by the 1960s and early 1970s (see, for example, Gawthorp 1971; Dvorin and Simmons 1972). This was not so at the local governmental level, which has almost exclusively remained non-partisan. Donald Rowat (1975, 29–30) suggests that the reason for this senior/local governmental divergence is because 'Canadian cities have tended to copy forms of local government developed in the United States. They have been influenced far more than have the higher levels of government by American democratic experiments.' Rowat concludes that the longevity of the local government non-partisan tradition in Canada might be because it was 'imported near the end of the last century after the local non-partisan movement had become strong, but before the party battle was well established in English local politics.' Warren Magnusson (1983, 10) agrees, suggesting that this upper/lower-tier divergence is because local politicians themselves found this arrangement convenient, as it allowed them 'greater freedom of action' once in office. It also meant that property interests came to predominate. Whatever the reason for continuing the local non-partisan tradition, this type of arrangement is clearly out of step with what has come to be accepted as a common Canadian norm.

Non-partisan systems remove the commonly held view that electoral democracy – and democratic policy making – rests on a competitive party system. As noted by Lortie (Canada 1991), Banfield and Wilson (1985) and others, political parties and politics play the vital role of aggregating preferences into policy choice and providing labels that can be easily identified by voters.² Non-partisan elections are generally personality contests devoid of substantive policy discussion, as candidates do not fight under one common banner and have little capacity to develop policy platforms on which they collectively campaign or for which they can be held politically accountable. As such, once elected, candidates often have no common policy goals and are either free to forward their own private agendas, or, more commonly, to react to pressures from organized interests or civil servants. Simply stated, non-

partisan politics in large cities undermine the capacity of decision makers to generate a public agenda for elected officials to transform into a governmental agenda.

In the same vein as non-partisanship runs a tendency to reject constituency-based, 'ward' systems for 'at-large' elections in which municipalities are treated as a single, all-encompassing multimember constituency. Again, borrowed from American municipalities, at-large electoral arrangements, particularly when coupled with a first-past-the-post system of vote counting, have had the effect of disenfranchising racial and ethnic minorities and lowering voter turnout. The end result is that the local governmental agenda often only includes the preferences of a small portion of residents within the municipality (Smith and Stewart 1998). According to Howard Scarrow, at-large elections 'cancel out the strength of geographically concentrated groups of voters (e.g. party groups, racial groups), and they make it difficult for a voter to vote for an individual candidate, rather than for one of the competing list of candidates' (1999, 557). Although at-large systems have been replaced by wards systems by court orders in a large number of U.S. municipalities, and have been all but eradicated in Canada, they still exist in some cities, such as Vancouver (for a detailed account of the U.S. experience see Grofman, Bernard, Davidson, et al. 1992).

As found at the national and provincial levels, unlimited election spending opens the door for wealthy groups and interests to have undue influence on setting the governmental agenda and often closes out those with fewer resources. Election spending limits have been common practice for decades in Canadian federal and provincial elections, yet spending in many local electoral contests in Canada remains uncapped and sometimes even unmonitored. This is problematic, given that although local elections are often perceived as inexpensive competitions between local candidates, the reality can be quite different. Elections in large Canadian cities can generate campaign spending in the millions. For example, the two major parties contesting the 2002 Vancouver civic elections spent almost \$3 million on advertising and election-related spending (Bula 2004, B1). These high expenditures by local 'parties' all but eliminate independent candidates or less established parties and put enormous pressure on local politicians to raise funds, badly biasing the local electoral process (Smith and Stewart 1998; Stewart 2003). According to the 1991 Royal (Lortie) Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, limiting election expenditure is essential to ensuring fairness during the electoral process:

Freedom of expression in the electoral process ... cannot be meaningfully achieved unless the laws that govern this process explicitly seek to promote fairness in the exercise of this freedom. In this critical respect, the electoral law should not presume that all participants will have equal resources to communicate with the electorate. To do so would be to ignore the fact that different participants draw upon different bases of political support to finance their campaigns. Nor should electoral law assume that inequalities among participants are irrelevant to the outcome of elections. To do so would be to ignore the known effects of political communication: the capacity to communicate often, to use different media and to develop messages with the assistance of marketing and advertising experts is a significant factor in the political persuasion of voters ... In these respects, the political process must not be equated with the economic marketplace. (Canada 1991, 324)

In sum, free, fair, and competitive elections generate mandates for governments that guide their actions while they hold office. Most readers will probably appreciate the chaos that would ensue if national or provincial elections were held without parties, under at-large systems with unlimited spending. Elected politicians would be directionless and held hostage to either the demands of a small constituency of voters on whom they rely for support or a small constituency of funders who provide them with the monies needed to win expensive election contests. At the very least, they would be less able to play an effective role in participating and leading the policy analysis process.

Legislative Stage

During the legislative stage, decision makers further refine and implement their agenda. It is also during this stage that they interact with existing knowledge generators and brokers and evaluate the value of their advice. As refining and implementing efforts are contingent on the resources decision makers have at their disposal, it is this factor on which we concentrate our efforts.

One way of ensuring that politicians have enough time for their consultative and supervisory roles is to offer adequate incentives or remuneration. It has been long established that an adequate wage and benefit package is essential to keep public servants committed to their jobs, with political officials being no exception (Girth and Mills 1963; Dowding 1995). However, the Canadian local government tradition has

been to elect a small number of politicians to part-time positions. Canadian local council positions have traditionally been under-rewarded for the work involved, and they frequently supplement their income by working other jobs. As Crawford (1954, 101) notes, in the early 1950s the norm was clearly for part-time municipal politicians who were elsewhere in full-time occupations and who received little in the way of remuneration. In some provinces, payment to municipal councillors was actually prohibited.³ Connected to above-noted notions of non-partisanship in local governing, the reason for part-time politicians was clear: 'It is claimed by the advocates of pay for councillors that it would make it possible for men to serve who could not otherwise afford to lose the required time from their work. One of the objections to such payments is that they may be an inducement to persons who have little to contribute but who are primarily interested in the extra income. The type of representative who is most needed is not likely to be influenced to seek office by the pay involved' (Crawford 1954, 104).

This view echoed a 1947 (Lindsay Committee) Report, *Expenses of Members of Local Authorities* (1947a), in England: 'The health of this democracy depends upon the fact that large numbers of men and women give their time and trouble to all sorts of voluntary work, and it is from such public-spirited people that the members of public authorities should be recruited. Such voluntary work must involve sacrifice, and indeed would lose its savour if it did not.'

And while Lindsay did recommend that 'local authorities should have power to pay actual fares reasonably incurred on public transport, reasonable mileage allowance ... and subsistence expenses ... allowances for loss of remunerative time should be at a maximum of one pound per day (with) details of the payments ... published in the minutes.' That same year, the Minority (Turton) Report for the Lindsay Committee (1947b) also argued 'that the voluntary character of local government work should be preserved.' This view of part-time politicians had begun to shift a little by the 1970s. Rowat has noted that this change began with local administration in Canada's cities:

Especially in cities, where the job of councillor should be full-time or nearly so, the salaries are far too low to match the responsibilities of the job. An undesirable result of regarding the job as part-time, with only part-time pay, is that salaried professionals and other employees don't run for office ... Hence, the candidates are mainly self-employed professionals or businessmen ... who are more likely to represent the interests of

business and the developers than ... the whole community ... Councillor's pay must be high enough not only to attract the most capable people ... but also to help give the office the dignity and esteem that it deserves. (1975, 40)

A second potential problem is that even if financial compensation is adequate, municipal councillors may not see the value of making a long-term commitment to their positions. At federal and some provincial positions in Canada, for example, politicians are provided with additional benefits such as pensions after a number of years in service. As is the case with higher salaries, this additional remunerative component provides incentives to develop longer-term political careers and commit to developing and implementing policy platforms with sufficient public support to secure and maintain office. An inadequate salary and benefit package structure heightens the risk of politicians either looking elsewhere for reward, lessening the incentive to keep their word, or being less attentive to their public office duties. Here again, contemporary local governments in major Canadian cities vary significantly from the clear benchmarks established for provincial and federal governments.

Like their federal and provincial counterparts, once in government local politicians rely substantially on the civil service to implement their election promises and for detailed policy advice. At the local governmental level staff may be even more important due to the previously mentioned lack of external knowledge generators and brokers. One of the classic public administration problems is how political 'principals' can compel their bureaucratic 'agents' to implement a political agenda, especially in large polities. Much of the literature on political/bureaucratic relations focuses on the problems of civil servants hiding or controlling information in order to budget maximize or bureau shape (Niskanen 1973; Dunleavy 1991). As Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1963, 233-4) summarizes, 'every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.' This can become a feature *within* government itself, particularly between politicians and bureaucrats: '... the pure interest of the bureaucracy in power ... is efficacious far beyond those areas where purely functional interests make for secrecy ... In facing a parliament out of sheer power instinct, the bureaucracy fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts, or from interest groups. The so-called right of parliamentary investigation is

one of the means by which parliament seeks such knowledge. Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and powerless parliament – at least insofar as ignorance somehow agrees with the bureaucracy's interests.'

At the extreme end, the capacity of bureaucratic actors to significantly influence policy outcomes has been called 'bureaucratic capture.' As Thomas Dye (2001, 140) has recently suggested: 'bureaucracies grow in size and gain in power with advances in technology, increases in information, and growth in the size and complexity of society ... The power of the bureaucracy is also enhanced when ... policymaking responsibility ... [is] deliberately shift[ed] ... to the bureaucrats [by politicians] ... The internal dynamics of bureaucratic governance also expands bureaucratic power. Bureaucracies regularly press for increases in their own size and budgets and for additions to their own regulatory authority ... Finally, bureaucratic expansionism is facilitated by the 'incremental' nature of most policymaking.'

Canadian political scientist Ted Hodgetts' idea that the bureaucracy accurately reflects and responds to societal pressure (1973, 344) suggests that Weber overstates the case, but Dye and others continue to note the potential of 'bureaucratic influence' and 'capture' (see, for example, Albrow 1970; Blau and Meyer 1971; Downs 1967). Guy Peters concludes that the truth probably lies 'somewhere in between':

bureaucratic institutions ... do have some influence in the redistribution of powers away from elective institutions and in the direction of bureaucracy itself ... This capacity ... of the permanent staff ... essentially to determine the agenda of their political masters ... becomes especially important in the presence of an agency ideology concerning the proper goals for the agency to pursue and the proper means of attaining those goals. Through the ability to control information, proposals for policy, and the knowledge concerning feasibility, the bureaucracy is certainly capable of influencing agency policy, if not determining it. It requires an unusual politician to be able to overcome this type of control within an agency. (2001, 23-4)

Where federal and provincial politicians are provided with both the administrative and political staff necessary to aid their participation during the policy analysis process, this is often not the case in most local governments. In smaller towns and villages, part-time politicians often rely on the advice of a single city clerk and can perform many adminis-

Table 11.1 Eight Detrimental Electoral and Legislative Institutional Arrangements

A. Election Stage	B. Legislative Stage
A1. Non-partisan electoral systems	B1. Inadequate pay for councillors
A2. At-large elections	B2. Absence of council pension scheme
A3. Unlimited election spending	B3. High supervisory load
	B4. Inadequate support staff
	B5. Inadequate policy staff

trative duties themselves. This lack of staff not only forces elected officials to dedicate their time to more mundane issues, but does not allow them to garner advice from those concerned with their electoral mandate or re-election.

The Capacity of Local Decision Makers in Eight Major Canadian Cities

The last section described how local decision makers' efforts to effectively generate and implement governmental agendas might be undermined by inferior institutional arrangements and under-resourcing. Table 11.1 sets out the above-discussed details in order to investigate these problems in eight Canadian cities. It has been argued that non-partisan elections conducted under at-large arrangements with no election expense limits will greatly undermine the ability of local politicians to develop broad-based governmental agendas through which to direct later policy analysis. Likewise, under-compensated, understaffed politicians are less able to direct and supervise staff or interact with local knowledge generators or brokers.

Electoral Stage Institutions

The three core factors of any electoral process are the party system, vote-to-seat conversion method and resource regulation (i.e., election expenses). Of particular interest in this study are non-partisan systems, which here are defined as those contests which prohibit candidates from placing a party name, acronym or symbol beside their own name on the ballot.⁴ While local political candidates often have other political alliances that might reveal their political leanings, the lack of a party identification on the ballot has been shown to stifle – if not completely

Table 11.2 Population, Council Structure, and Partisanship in Eight Canadian Cities

City	Population (2001)	Mayor	Councillors	Non-Partisan	At-Large	Unlimited Spending
Vancouver	568,442	Y	10	No	Yes	Yes
Montreal	1,812,723	Y	73	No	No	No
Calgary	878,866	Y	14	Yes	No	Yes
Toronto	2,481,494	Y	44	Yes	No	No
Edmonton	666,104	Y	13	Yes	No	Yes
Winnipeg	619,544	Y	15	Yes	No	No
Ottawa	774,072	Y	21	Yes	No	No
Halifax	359,111	Y	23	Yes	No	Yes

eliminate – parties from the local election process (Smith and Stewart 1998). The point here is not that candidates in non-partisan political systems do not have distinct political preferences or ideological leanings, but rather that the lack of organized – and electorally identifiable – parties remove the incentive for candidates to organize under identifiable party labels and, subsequently, present common policy proposals to the public during elections.

In addition to the population and council structure, table 11.2 identifies each study city as partisan or non-partisan, whether each system uses an at-large configuration and whether or not election spending is limited. As shown above, where all cities have a mayors and councillors, only Vancouver and Montreal have fully partisan systems. Where identifiable local parties may have existed for short periods in some cities, such as Winnipeg, the absence of party names on local ballots makes these affiliations difficult, if not impossible, to maintain, and are of little benefit to the local voter as the main source of information, because affiliation is absent from the ballot.

Table 11.2 also indicates that Vancouver is the only major Canadian city to have an at-large electoral system. The subject of much debate and local plebiscites, the at-large system has remained in place despite concerted council efforts to replace it with a ward system as allowed under the *Vancouver Charter* (British Columbia 2004a). On 16 October 2004, 22.6 per cent of registered voters rejected changing to a ward system by a margin of 46 per cent 'Yes' to 54 per cent 'No.' A local electoral commission struck to review the citizen participation in the local decision-making process decided to recommend a vote be held despite warnings that low turnout and skewed results would be the result of an off-election year vote (City of Vancouver 2004). These

problems were further compounded by the lack of any 'electoral' spending limits. While other cities have used full at-large systems or multi-member wards in the past, all have abandoned what have been shown to be discriminatory systems in favour of wards. Although discussions of proportional representation have started at the national and provincial levels – such as British Columbia's Citizen Assembly proposals for STV electoral reform provincially (British Columbia 2004b) – they have yet to be undertaken with any seriousness in Canada's major cities.

Finally, table 11.2 also shows that many cities now employ spending limits during local elections. Where all eight cities now compel candidates to disclose donors, only Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Ottawa cap the amount of money candidates may spend in their struggle to gain office. Following the long-established lead of their federal and provincial counterparts, these four cities also partially reimburse candidates for election expenses. Out of all cities, only Montreal avoids the pitfalls of non-partisanship, at-large systems, and unlimited election spending and, from an electoral perspective at least, can be considered the study city most likely to play an effective role in the policy analysis process.

Legislative Stage Institutions

According to the previous sections, politicians need to be adequately resourced if they are going to be able to effectively develop policy, supervise staff and interact with knowledge generators and knowledge brokers. The tables and discussion below examine pay and staffing levels for local politicians in Canada's eight major cities. Salaries, pensions and administrative and political staffing levels all play an important role in determining the attentiveness of local decision makers. Table 11.3 shows mayoral salaries (in 2004 dollars) for the eight cities, in 1950, 1975, and 2004. These figures reveal some clear patterns. First, while salaries for mayors were low in many of Canada's larger cities in 1950, they had climbed considerably by 2004, averaging \$116,000. Second, salary strongly correlates with the population. Mayors from larger Canadian cities are paid more than mayors of somewhat smaller cities. For the purposes of this chapter, it would appear that the financial incentives for remaining mayor are high in all study cities. At least in terms of pay, the incentive structure would seem to be conducive to hardworking, attentive, and full-time mayors. As demonstrated in table 11.4, councillors have less incentive than mayors to perform as full-time

Table 11.3 Mayoral Salaries 1950–2004 (2004 dollars)

City	2004	% Increase	1975	% Increase	1950
Toronto	\$142,539	75%	\$81,341	-27%	\$111,822
Montreal	\$130,000	74%	\$74,781	0%	\$74,548
Calgary	\$122,658	56%	\$78,717	76%	\$44,729
Vancouver	\$115,617	26%	\$91,837	64%	\$55,911
Edmonton	\$111,803	42%	\$78,717	n/a	n/a
Ottawa	\$110,000	62%	\$67,891	n/a	n/a
Winnipeg	\$101,850	11%	\$91,837	54%	\$59,638
Halifax	\$96,693	36%	\$70,845	90%	\$37,274
Avg.	\$116,395	48%	\$79,496	43%	\$63,987

Table 11.4 Council Salaries 1950–2004 (2004 dollars)

City	2004	% Increase	1975	% Increase	1950
Toronto	\$84,068	78%	\$47,230	252%	\$13,419
Montreal	\$45,000	243%	\$13,120	193%	\$4,473
Calgary	\$61,329	160%	\$23,615	322%	\$5,591
Vancouver	\$50,932	62%	\$31,487	135%	\$13,419
Edmonton	\$58,405	69%	\$34,635	n/a	n/a
Ottawa	\$56,000	106%	\$27,220	n/a	n/a
Winnipeg	\$54,325	216%	\$17,200	28%	\$13,419
Halifax	\$39,089	49%	\$26,239	487%	\$4,473
Avg.	\$56,144	103%	\$27,593	202%	\$9,132

politicians. Although salaries have dramatically increased in most cities since 1950, they are still much lower than mayoral salaries. For example, at just under \$51,000, the salary for a Vancouver city councillor is just \$5,000 higher than the salary of the average full-time worker in the city. Considering the stress and high profile of the job, this remuneration would not seem to be enough to keep politicians interested in sticking to their policy agendas or staying attentive to their jobs while in office. The \$84,000 salary of a Toronto city councillor might be expected to provide more incentive to pursue the job in the long term and to be attentive to democratic aspects of the process of governing. As shown in table 11.5, only three cities do not offer pensions to local council members: Vancouver, Halifax, and Ottawa. The other cities offer a variety of schemes of variable benefit. Again, pension schemes would be expected to provide politicians some incentive to pursue their posts over the long term and make extra effort to implement election prom-

Table 11.5 Pension Benefits

City	Pension	Terms
Vancouver	N	
Halifax	N	
Ottawa	N	
Winnipeg	Y	1.5% of best years at age 55 after 30 years of service
Edmonton	Y	6%
Toronto	Y	Same as regular city employees
Calgary	Y	2% final term's average earnings after age 60
Montreal	Y	2% of annual gross salary for every year of service at age 60 and after 2 years of service

Table 11.6 Supervisory Capacity

City	Total city employees	Full-time councillors	Part-time councillors	Total councillors	Ratio
Halifax	3,700	0	24	12	308:1
Montreal	29,000	53	20	63	460:1
Ottawa	12,000	22	0	22	545:1
Winnipeg	8,300	15	0	15	553:1
Edmonton	9,785	13	0	13	753:1
Calgary	11,295	14	0	14	941:1
Toronto	46,000	44	0	44	1045:1
Vancouver	9,000	0	10	5	1800:1

ises while holding office. In terms of overall legislative stage arrangements, it would appear that Toronto, Edmonton, and Calgary are at least slightly ahead of other cities in this regard. Table 11.6 illustrates the supervisory capacity of councils in each of the eight study cities. Here the number of councillors is compared to the number of city employees. In building the ratio, part-time councillors are counted as half a full-time councillor. Thus a part-time councillor in Halifax is considered as available to do half the workload of a full-time councillor in Ottawa. In terms of ratios, then, Halifax's 24 part-time councillors equate to 12 full-time councillors and when dividing into the number of employees means that each full-time equivalent council position must oversee 308 staff members. Ottawa's 22 full-time councillors supervise 12,000 for a 545:1 ratio while Vancouver councillors face an 1800:1 ratio. In terms of policy analysis and planning capacity, the cities with the highest ratio appear to have a much heavier supervisory responsibility. Table 11.7 describes the number of support staff available to local coun-

Table 11.7 Political and Nonpolitical Council Support Staff (2004)

City	Total employees	Total council support staff	Political	Non-political	Employee/ support staff ratio	Employee/ political support staff ratio
Winnipeg	8,300	41	39	2	202:1	213:1
Toronto	46,000	153	106	47	301:1	434:1
Montreal	29,000	56	32	24	518:1	906:1
Calgary	11,295	16	9	7	706:1	1255:1
Ottawa	12,000	14	6	8	857:1	2000:1
Vancouver	9,000	12	3	9	750:1	3000:1
Edmonton	9,785	10	2	8	979:1	4893:1
Halifax	3,700	7	0	7	529:1	n/a

cils. Non-political support staff are regular city employees working in an administrative capacity for the mayor or council, including secretaries and receptionists. Political support staff are those appointed by mayors or councillors, such as political advisors or constituency office workers. A ratio has been devised for both categories by dividing the number of employees by both staff figures for each city. Here Winnipeg has the best support staff/employee ratio (202:1) where Edmonton's is worst (979:1), meaning that councillors in Edmonton will most likely have the most administrative/public correspondence tasks and the least 'political' support. The table also shows that with the exception of Halifax, all cities have some political staff to advise elected officials. In terms of the ability to provide a counter to the agendas of regular city staff, Winnipeg's institutional arrangements allow local decision makers to play a fuller role in the policy analysis process, while Edmonton offers the least opportunity in this regard.

Conclusion: Assessing Local Institutional Planning Incapacities

The purpose of this article was not only to take a first look at, but also to compare the capacity of local decision makers to be effective during the policy analysis process in eight major Canadian cities. The comparison in this section is only meant to identify whether cities are more or less likely to be so. While further exploration would be needed to test whether local politicians with perceived institutional weaknesses actually have less ability to participate fully, the work here suggests where such a study might start. Table 11.8 offers a ranking of each city based

Table 11.8 Policy-Analysis-Friendly City Rankings

City	Score	Non-partisan elections	At-large system	Unlimited election spending	Below salary median	No pension	Below supervisory capacity		Below support staff		Political support staff	
							median	median	median	median	median	median
Montreal	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Toronto	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Winnipeg	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halifax	4	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Ottawa	4	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
Calgary	4	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Edmonton	5	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Vancouver	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

on an indicator that combines scores from the previously explained eight factors. Where binary scores are entered '0/1,' other indicators have been reduced into 'above or below median' scores. Under this scheme, Montreal ranks most, and Vancouver least friendly in terms of how able decision makers are to meaningfully participate in policy analysis. Montreal would appear to have the set of institutions most conducive to elected politicians directing and supervising policy analysis in their city, with the only real problem being below median council salaries. With its at-large electoral system, unlimited election spending, low council salaries, no pensions, and low number of councillors and support staff, Vancouver City Council earns the least friendly ranking. Here local decision makers are not as likely to propose a government agenda, or supervise staff. Overall it would appear that some cities are clearly more favourably suited to policy analysis than others, but it is also evident that all need to examine the institutions that are supposed to enable local decision makers to effectively participate in the policy analysis process.

Taking this analysis further, the better prepared and resourced Montreal politicians are less likely to rely on city staff alone for direction and can challenge the policy advice of internal actors by taking advice from external knowledge generators and knowledge brokers. If these other policy community actors are scarce, Montreal city council could use local funds to help establish and enable these communities in order to facilitate better public policy analysis. It is arguable that the other cities are more, and some much more, reliant on internal staff for policy direction and generation. As stated earlier, not only might this lead to less fully developed policy analysis, but in the worst case it could mean that local politicians end up captured by their own civil servants. This lack of capacity to effectively participate and stimulate the local policy analysis process would appear to be problematic in an era when cities are gaining more powers and more independence from senior levels of government.

NOTES

This research was partly funded through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council MCRI grant on Multilevel Government and Public Policy in Municipalities project.

1 The authors presented an earlier version of this work, titled 'Unaided

Politicians in Unaided City Councils? Explaining Policy Advice In Canadian Cities,' at the British Columbia Political Studies Association, Richmond, BC, May, 2004 and are grateful for the comments of Don Alexander and Doug McArthur and the research assistance of Matthew Bourke of the SFU/MPP program.

- 2 In *City Politics*, Banfield and Wilson (1963, 20) argue that 'politics, like sex, cannot be abolished, no matter how much we deny it.'
- 3 Provinces prohibiting councillor payments were Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (for *town* councillors), Quebec (for *local* municipalities) and British Columbia (for *village* councillors).
- 4 Elections legislation regulating voting in Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg allow only the names of candidates to be printed on ballots (Local Authorities Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-21; Municipal Elections Act 1996; Manitoba The Local Authorities Election Act 2005) whereas section 77 of the *Vancouver Charter* allows the inclusion of 'the abbreviation or acronym of the endorsing elector organization for a candidate, as shown on the nomination documents for the candidate.'

REFERENCES

- Alberta. 2004. *Local Authorities Election Act, R.S.A. 2000*. Edmonton: Queen's Printer.
- Albrow, Martin. 1970. *Bureaucracy*. London: Macmillan.
- Banfield, Edward, and James Q. Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. New York: Random House.
- Better Environmentally Sound Transportation. 2005. www.best.bc.ca.
- Blau, Peter, and Marshall Meyer. 1971. *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*. New York: Random House.
- British Columbia. 2004a. *Vancouver Charter*. Victoria: Queen's Printer.
- British Columbia. 2004b. *Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. Making Every Vote Count: The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia*. Victoria: Queen's Printer.
- Bula, Frances. 2004. 'Don't Count Out COPE Yet, Analysts Say.' *The Vancouver Sun*, 19 October, B1.
- Canada, Royal (Lambert) Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. 1979. *Report*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Canada, Royal (Lortie) Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. 1991. *Reforming Electoral Democracy*. Volume 1. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. 1976. *Puppets on A Shoestring*. Ottawa: CFMM (April).
- City of Vancouver. 2003. *Budget 2002*. Vancouver: City of Vancouver.
- 2004. *A City of Neighbourhoods: Report of the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform (Berger) Commission*. Vancouver: City of Vancouver.
- 2005. *Homeless Action Plan*. Vancouver: City of Vancouver.
- Crawford, K. Grant. 1954. *Canadian Municipal Government*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1991. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dowding, Keith. 1995. *The Civil Service*. London: Routledge.
- Downs, Anthony. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Dvorin, Eugene, and Robert Simmons. 1972. *From Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy*. San Francisco, CA: Canfield Press.
- Dye, Thomas R. 2001. *Top Down Policymaking*. New York: Chatham House.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Gawthrop, Louis. 1971. *Administrative Politics and Social Change*. New York: St Martin's.
- Gerth, H.H., and C.W. Mills. 1963. *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goodenow, Frank. 1893. *Comparative Administrative Law*. New York: Putnam.
- 1905. *The Principles of Administrative Law in the United States*. New York: Putnam.
- Greater Vancouver Regional District. 2003. *3 Ways to Home: Regional Homelessness Plan for Greater Vancouver*. Vancouver: Greater Vancouver Regional District.
- Griffith, J.A.G. 1966. *Central Departments and Local Authorities*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Grofman, Bernard, and Chandler Davidson, eds. 1992. *Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
- Hodgetts, J.E. 1973. *The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Howlett, Michael, and M. Ramesh. 2003. *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Kernaghan, Ken, and David Siegel. 1987. *Public Administration in Canada: A Text*. Toronto: Methuen.
- 1999. *Public Administration in Canada*. Toronto: ITP Nelson.

- Lindquist, Evert. 1990. 'The Third Community, Policy Inquiry, and Social Scientists.' In Stephen Brooks and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Social Scientists, Policy, and the State*, 21–51. New York: Praeger.
- Magnusson, Warren. 1983. 'Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government.' In Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, eds., *City Politics in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Manitoba. 2004. *Local Authorities Election Act*. Winnipeg: Queen's Printer.
- Non-Partisan Association. 2005. www.npavancouver.ca.
- Niskanen, William. 1973. *Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? Lessons from America*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Ontario. 2004. *Municipal Elections Act, 1996*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- Pal, Leslie A. 1997. *Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times*. Toronto: ITP Nelson.
- Peters, B. Guy. 2001. *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. New York: Routledge.
- Riordan, William. 1963. *Plunkett of Tammany Hall*. New York: E.P. Dutton.
- Rowat, Donald. 1975. *Your Local Government*. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Sayre, Wallace S. 1958. 'Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging.' *Public Administration Review* 18(1), 102–5.
- Scarrow, Howard. 1999. 'The Impact of At-large Elections: Vote Dilution or Choice Dilution?' *Electoral Studies* 18, 557–67.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1976. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. 6th ed. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Smith, Patrick J., and Kennedy Stewart. 1998. *Making Local Accountability Work in British Columbia*. Vancouver: Institute of Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University. Government-commissioned report for British Columbia Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.
- 2004a. 'Unaided Politicians in Unaided City Councils? Explaining Policy Advice in Canadian Cities.' Paper for the British Columbia Political Studies Association, Richmond, BC, May.
 - 2004b. 'Beavers and Cats Revisited: Has the Local-Intergovernmental Game Shifted to the Mushy Middle?' *Korean Local Government Review* 6, 123–56.
 - 2005. 'Local Government Reform in British Columbia, 1991–2005: One Oar in the Water.' In J. Garcea and E. Lesage Jr., eds., *Municipal Reforms in Canada: Dimensions, Dynamics, Determinants*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, Kennedy. 2003. *Think Democracy*. Vancouver: Institute of Governance Studies.
- Tindal, C. Richard, and Susan Nobes Tindal. 2004. *Local Government in Canada*. 6th ed. Toronto: Nelson.

- UK. 1947a. (*Lord Lindsay*) *Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Expenses of Members of Local Authorities*. London: HMSO.
- 1947b. *Turton Minority Report for the Interdepartmental Committee on Expenses of Members of Local Authorities*. London: HMSO, April.
- Weir, Stuart, and David Beetham. 1999. *Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain: The Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom*. London: Routledge.
- White, Leonard D. 1926. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*. New York: Macmillan.
- 1955. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan.
- Willoughby, William F. 1927. *Principles of Public Administration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Wilson, V. Seymour. 1981. *Canadian Public Policy and Administration*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
- Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. 'The Study of Administration.' *Political Science Quarterly*, 2. Reprinted in Peter Woll, ed. 1966. *Public Administration and Policy*, 15–41. New York: Harper and Row.